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Can Free Evidence Be Bad?: Value of Information
for the Imprecise Probabilist
Seamus Bradley and Katie Steele
June 30, 2015
Abstract
This paper considers a puzzling conflict between two positions that
are each compelling: (A) it is irrational for an agent to pay to avoid
‘free’ evidence before making a decision, and (B) rational agents may
have imprecise beliefs and/or desires. Indeed, we show that Good’s
theorem (Good, 1967) concerning the invariable choice-worthiness of
free evidence does not generalise to the imprecise realm, given the
plausible existing decision theories for handling imprecision. A key
ingredient in the analysis, and a potential source of controversy, is the
general approach taken for resolving sequential decision problems –
we make explicit what the key alternatives are and defend our own
approach. Furthermore, we endorse a resolution of the aforementioned
puzzle – we privilege decision theories that merely permit avoiding
free evidence over decision theories for which avoiding free evidence
is uniquely admissible. Finally, we situate this particular result about
free evidence within the broader ‘dynamic-coherence’ literature.
1 Introduction
If evidence is available for ‘free’1, it is presumably a good idea to pursue
that evidence and take it into account when making decisions. Good (1967)
proves as much for the case where Your2 degrees of belief are precise. That
is, Good proves that when Your beliefs or credence can be represented by
a single probability function, free evidence cannot be detrimental. Good
proves that, under standard conditions, Your expectation increases (or at
least cannot decrease) if You pursue free evidence.3
1What exactly it means for evidence to be free will be discussed later.
2‘You’ is the arbitrary intentional agent who is under discussion. This practice begins,
appropriately, with Good.
3A posthumous publication of Ramsey’s work contains a precursor of the theorem
(Ramsey, 1990). In the preamble to the publication, Sahlin also notes a precursor in
Savage (1954). Moreover, Kadane et al. (2008) cite a version of the theorem in Raiffa and
Schlaifer (1961).
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In the case where Your credence is imprecise, however, no such nice result
exists. Indeed, several authors have shown that, in such cases, You may
effectively pay to avoid free evidence (Kadane et al., 2008; Gru¨nwald and
Halpern, 2004). These examples rely on the phenomenon of dilation (Seiden-
feld and Wasserman, 1993; Pedersen and Wheeler, 2014). What happens in
dilation is that conditionalising on some evidence can cause an event whose
prior probability was sharp to have an unsharp posterior probability. This
‘fuzzying’ of Your degrees of belief may lead to Your paying to avoid free
evidence. This paper investigates the puzzle suggested by this result.
Let us quickly set the scene. Many have argued, convincingly, that rational-
ity permits imprecision: a rational agent may have incomplete preferences
that are best represented by a set of probability- and utility-function pairs,
rather than a single, precise such pair.4 On the other hand, rationality
surely requires that an agent not pay to avoid free evidence. If all plausible
decision theories for handling imprecision have the consequence that You
may pay to avoid free evidence, we have a contradiction, and must consider
which of the premises should be given up.
The next section presents the apparent trilemma in more detail: we initially
outline the set-up for, and statement of, Good’s theorem, and show, by
example and in line with other authors, that his lesson about the invariable
goodness of free evidence does not straightforwardly extend to the imprecise
context. While not an original aspect of the paper, we think it important
to carefully explain Good’s reasoning about free evidence, and its prima
facie extension to the imprecise realm, because this is a noteworthy and
interesting issue for decision theory that deserves attention. We go on to
clarify the premises of our proposed trilemma. This serves to highlight the
main issue of the paper: whether all plausible decision theories for handling
imprecision do in fact fall afoul of free-evidence intuitions.
In order to discuss the commitments of different decision rules regarding
free evidence, it is necessary to first elaborate, in Section 3, how You should
negotiate a dynamic- or sequential-decision problem, i.e. a decision problem
that involves choices both now and in the future. We do not dispute the
orthodox sophisticated-choice approach, but we show that it has not been
adequately spelled out in the current literature, and the missing details leave
room for controversy that is relevant to our free-evidence trilemma. So we
4Formal treatments of imprecise probabilism can be found in Walley (1991) and Au-
gustin et al. (2014). Philosophical defenses of the view can be found in Levi (1974), Joyce
(2005) and Sturgeon (2008). Note that this paper focuses on imprecise beliefs, and we as-
sume utilities of basic outcomes are precise. Moreover, we restrict attention to imprecision
as represented by sets of probabilities, but we do not deny that there are alternative rep-
resentations of imprecision/uncertainty, such as Dempster-Shafer functions or upper and
lower probabilities. For a thorough analysis of the different representations of uncertainty,
see Halpern (2003).
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effectively introduce and argue for our own version of sophisticated choice
for the imprecise probabilist. In a sense, this middle section is the most
important contribution of the paper.
Section 4 then examines an important, perhaps even the only plausible,
decision rule for handling imprecision; this is the maximally permissive non-
dominated-set (NDS) rule. The NDS rule does not preclude paying to avoid
free evidence, but we prove that it at least never mandates such payment.
Section 5 comments on how this result fits into the broader decision theory
literature on dynamic coherence. In particular, we note that previous work
in the literature shows that no decision rule can do better than the NDS
rule with respect to the pursuit of free evidence. Section 6 summarises our
stance on the trilemma.
2 Good’s theorem and troubles for the imprecise probabilist
I.J. Good showed that it always pays in expectation for the precise proba-
bilist to pursue free evidence. The proof can be found in Good (1967). A key
assumption is that You conform to standard Bayesian decision theory, i.e.,
You are an expected utility maximiser and update Your beliefs in line with
the rule of conditionalisation.5 Good’s result accords with intuitions about
seeking evidence and experimentation being advantageous. Indeed David
Miller (1994) notes that one of A.J. Ayer’s two main criteria for a successful
account of scientific method is that the account should advise scientists to
pursue free evidence. (The second criterion is that the account should ad-
vise the scientist to base inferences on all the evidence available.) Bayesian
decision theory thus meets Ayer’s standards because it is not inconsistent
with the two criteria (notwithstanding Miller’s arguments to the contrary).
Carnap also discussed what he called the ‘Principle of Total Evidence’ which
amounted to the claim that reasoners should not ignore available evidence
when estimating a probability.6
The problem set-up for the proof is as follows: There is a partition of the
state space H1, . . . ,Hr and some acts A1, . . . , As which can have different
payouts for the different events Hi. Your utility for an act in a particular
event is: U(Aj(Hi)). Your credences over the events are Pr(Hi). There is
another partition of the state space E1, . . . , Et. You are offered the chance
5The requirement that updating be by conditionalisation can be generalised: Skyrms
(1990); Huttegger (2013).
6Good in fact claimed that his theorem shows that Carnap’s ‘Principle of Total Evi-
dence’ (PTE) is a consequence of Bayesian decision theory. We think this confuses the
maxim that ‘one should always base one’s beliefs on the totality of one’s evidence’ with
the maxim that ‘one should always seek new potential evidence if it is cost-free’. The
former maxim, the PTE, concerns the set-up of a Bayesian model, or else it is simply an
aspect of probabilism (cf. Miller (1994), p. 159). By contrast, the second maxim is a
consequence of Bayesian decision theory.
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E1 . . . Et Average
A1
∑
P (Hi|E1)U(A1(Hi)) . . .
∑
P (Hi|Et)U(A1(Hi))
∑
P (Hi)U(A1(Hi))
A2
∑
P (Hi|E1)U(A2(Hi)) . . .
∑
P (Hi|Et)U(A2(Hi))
∑
P (Hi)U(A2(Hi))
...
. . .
...
As
∑
P (Hi|E1)U(As(Hi)) . . .
∑
P (Hi|Et)U(As(Hi))
∑
P (Hi)U(As(Hi))
Table 1: The idea behind the proof
to learn which Ek obtains. Pursuing the new evidence has no disutility asso-
ciated with it so the utilities of the basic outcomes in the decision problem
are the same whether or not You learn. This is essentially the meaning
of free evidence.7 Good shows that, under these assumptions, opting for
learning which Ek obtains has at least as high expectation as not learning,
and learning always has higher expectation when it is possible that the new
evidence may change Your choice of act amongst A1, . . . , As.
The idea behind the proof is illustrated in Table 1.8 Not learning effectively
means choosing among the averages of the acts conditional on each Ek. Your
expectation is thus the maximum value in the final ‘Average’ column. Your
expectation for learning, on the other hand, is the average of the maximums
in each of the columns E1, . . . , Et. In short, learning is always at least as
good as not learning because the average of maximums is always at least as
high as the maximum average.
Consider the following simple example, depicted in Figure 1. Note that the
squares indicate choice nodes: places where You must make a choice; and
the circles indicate chance nodes: uncertainty that is then resolved one way
or another.9 There are two urns labelled X and Y . You believe that urn X
contains 10 black marbles and that urn Y contains 10 white marbles. One
urn will be selected at random by the toss of a fair coin and a marble drawn
from it. You are offered a 2 to 1 bet on black: if black is drawn You end up
with 3 and if white is drawn You lose your stake of 1. It should be obvious
that learning (i.e. ‘down’ at choice point 0) has higher expectation in this
case: if You were to learn that the draw is from X, You would bet on black
7Note that this condition excludes salient cases where apparently free evidence is not
expected to be beneficial, such as Your friend offering to tell You the end of the novel You
are reading, or the details of Your surprise party. In these cases, learning is not in fact
free, if it is properly modelled, because the knowledge changes the utility of the outcomes
directly.
8Strictly speaking, each cell of the columns labelled E1 or Et should look like this:∑
Pr(Hi|E1)U(A1(Hi ∩ E1)) since those are the basic elements of the space. This would
have made the table much more unwieldy, and not added to the exposition. In short, we
have made the assumption the utilities of the consequences of each act are not dependent
on which Ek occurs, given Hi. Nothing important hangs on this simplification of the
example.
9One can think of these circular chance nodes as ‘Nature’s choice nodes’.
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Figure 1: A simple decision problem
and predict a win of 3, and if You were to learn that the draw is from Y ,
You would refrain from betting and receive 0. Thus Your expectation would
be 0.5 × 3 + 0.5 × 0 = 1.5, which is greater than 1, the expected utility of
not learning (since if You chose up at node 0 You would choose to bet).
It is worth noting that Good’s proof concerns the expected value of free
evidence. It may be the case that You ‘get unlucky’, and Your expected
utility in fact goes down upon receiving some evidence. For instance, You
may learn that the draw is from Y in our example, giving an expectation of
0 (since if You learned Y You would choose not to bet), which is of course
less than 1. This is a possible eventuality; nonetheless, the expected utility
of learning free evidence (i.e. before a particular piece of evidence is actually
received) is greater than or equal to not learning.
Consider a slightly different example: You believe that urn X definitely
contains 8 black and 2 white marbles, and that urn Y contains 2 black and
8 white. Again, learning which urn is drawn from has higher expectation,
as You would tailor Your choice of ‘Bet’/‘Don’t bet’ to the new evidence,
as before. Here You would not be guaranteed the prize, by Your own lights,
even if You learn that the draw is from urn X, but Your choice will accord
with what You take to be the proportions of balls in the urn, whatever urn
is revealed, and so overall You have a higher expectation.
There is a problem when we try to apply this to the imprecise case. That
is, where Your belief is represented by a set of probability measures, P,
rather than just one measure. Call this set Your representor. Imagine a
scenario similar to the last one. Imagine You believe that there are a total
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of 10 black and 10 white marbles distributed somehow among the urns X
and Y . Each urn contains 10 marbles. An urn will be selected at random
by flipping a fair coin, and a marble drawn from it. Using X and Y to
refer to the propositions ‘the marble is drawn from urn X’ and ‘the marble
is drawn from urn Y ’, respectively; and using B and W to stand for the
propositions ‘the marble drawn is black’ and ‘the marble drawn is white’,
respectively; in the spirit of imprecise probabilism, the following is a plau-
sible characteristic of Your belief representor, P: Pr(B|X) = 1 − Pr(B|Y )
for all Pr ∈ P. As such, Your credences before learning regarding the
colour of the marble drawn are as follows: P(W ) = {0.5} = P(B). You
believe that the number of white marbles and the number of black mar-
bles are equal and that over the two urns their probabilities average out.
It seems plausible that Your conditional credences are, however, imprecise:
You have no information about how the marbles are distributed between
the urns, and so Your representor, P, plausibly includes the possibility that
urn X certainly contains only white marbles and also the possibility that
X certainly contains no white marbles, and everything in between. That is,
P(W |X) = P(B|X) = P(W |Y ) = P(B|Y ) = {0, 110 , . . . , 910 , 1}, or, if con-
vexivity were mandated (as per Levi (1974, 1980)), Your representor would
plausibly have P(W |X) = [0, 1], and likewise for the other conditional at-
titudes.10 For reasons of notational convenience we will stick to using [0, 1]
to represent the aforesaid imprecise conditional beliefs. So learning which
urn is drawn from dilates Your probability for white from 0.5 to [0, 1], and
likewise for black. Note that this analysis of the problem assumes the stan-
dard rule for updating imprecise beliefs, known as generalised conditioning,
which basically amounts to pointwise conditioning: After learning X, say,
{Pr(−|X) : Pr ∈ P} is Your new representor.11
Recall that You are offered a 2 to 1 bet on black: if black is drawn You
win 3 and if white is drawn You lose 1. Before learning, it is clear that
this bet is advantageous and You should take the bet, rather than stick
with the status quo. (As before, Your expectation for not learning, given
the credences described above, is 1.) If You choose to learn, on the other
hand, Your expectation for the bet will inevitably dilate from {1} to [−1, 3].
Whether or not the revealed urn is X or Y , the bet no longer has higher
than or equivalent expected utility to the status quo: the two acts in each
case become incommensurable. Pursuing free evidence is no longer straight-
forwardly better for You, even though it may lead to You changing Your
choice of option.
10Whether convexity is mandated when in fact the objective probability of drawing
white given X could not possibly be, say, 6
21
, is a tricky question and one we shall ignore.
Nothing in our discussion hinges on the sets of probabilities being convex.
11Refer to [BLINDED] for further discussion of this example, in particular whether
dilation is peculiar from a purely epistemic point of view.
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Figure 2: The problematic decision problem
Now imagine the same problem, except that choosing not to learn comes
with a small penalty of δ (where δ > 0). This makes the problem more
vivid, because now, if You choose not to learn, You are in fact paying to
avoid learning. Figure 2 depicts this revised problem. You face a choice at
the initial node (labelled 0) between learning and paying not to learn. let’s
assume Your credences are as before. Learning leads to evidence about the
coin flip – whether the urn to be drawn from is X or Y . As per Good’s the-
orem, the final decision problem is constant, whatever happens, except that
the option of not learning involves δ utility subtracted from all outcomes. If
You choose not to learn, You effectively pay δ to avoid free evidence.12
Imagine, for instance, that You conform to the so-called gamma-maximin
rule, which holds that one should always choose the option that has the
largest minimum expected utility.13 You would reason as follows: if learning
is chosen, there will inevitably be a choice between betting, with expected
utility [−1, 3], and not betting, with expected utility 0. The latter has the
greater minimum expected utility, so learning effectively leads to not taking
the bet, which has 0 utility. (This process of working backwards through
a decision problem is referred to as sophisticated reasoning or backward
12This is really a case of better-than-free evidence. Strictly speaking, learning does
change the utilities of the outcomes, so this is not really free evidence, as defined earlier.
However, the changes are uniformly for the better, so it’s still the case that You do not
pay to acquire the evidence. We call taking the ‘not learning’ branch ‘paying to avoid free
evidence’ when we should really say ‘choosing not to learn better-than-free evidence’.
13Ga¨rdenfors and Sahlin (1982), for instance, defend this rule. Seidenfeld (2004) refers
to the rule as gamma-maximin, and we follow this terminology here.
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induction. All of the examples here have involved sophisticated reasoning.
We say more about this in the next section.) Not learning, on the other
hand, will mean that the bet is chosen, and this has expected utility 1 − δ
from the initial vantage point. Assuming δ < 1, not learning is therefore
preferable. You thus pay to avoid free evidence.
By way of setting the stage for the remainder of the paper, let us be explicit
about the proposed trilemma:
P1 Paying to avoid free evidence is irrational.
P2 Incomplete preferences are not irrational, and can be represented by
sets of probabilities and utilities. In other words, imprecise probabilism
is permissible.
P3 All plausible decision theories for handling imprecision sanction paying
to avoid free evidence.
As mentioned earlier, P2 is defended elsewhere. We will revisit P1 later,
but let us simply note, for now, that it is hard to conceive how ‘money’
spent on avoiding free evidence could be money well spent. Decision theory
aside, any sensible person would surely ignore new free evidence that they
might obtain, if it is really unhelpful, rather than pay to remain ignorant
about it.
The initial focus of this section is the final premise, P3. What we have illus-
trated above is just that a very specific type of imprecise probabilist – one
whose belief-updating rule is generalised conditioning and who chooses ac-
cording to gamma-maximin – chooses making a payment over receiving free
evidence. It remains to be seen, however, whether this is also a consequence
of other decision theories for handling imprecision. Indeed, we now investi-
gate whether there may be alternative generalisations of standard Bayesian
decision theory that do not recommend this unintuitive course of action.
We will focus exclusively on alternative decision rules. That is, we do not
here consider alternative rules for updating belief, but rather assume gen-
eralised conditioning throughout. As mentioned above, this is arguably the
most natural generalisation of Bayesian conditioning for the imprecise con-
text. Stated in full, the rule holds that Your posterior belief in some propo-
sition H, after learning the proposition E, is just the set of conditional
probabilities pertaining to all probability functions in Your representor for
which the conditional is defined:
P(H|E) = {Pr(H|E),Pr ∈ P,Pr(E) 6= 0} (1)
This is the rule we implicitly assumed for the example above, and it is subject
to dilation. Of course, one might suggest that, given that dilation seems to
be directly implicated in paying to avoid free evidence, we should explore
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alternative rules for updating imprecise beliefs that might preclude dilation,
and its attendant problems. Elsewhere we do explore this possibility,14 but
this is not our focus in this paper. Note just that we do not regard this to
be a fruitful avenue for developing imprecise probabilism; dilation is not a
good reason for departing from generalised conditioning.
So, as mentioned, we restrict our attention to decision rules, and hold fixed
generalised conditioning as the belief-update rule. The gamma-maximin rule
assumed above is already criticised on other grounds (Seidenfeld, 2004), so
there is hope that the bad results concerning dilation are specific to this
rule. In what follows, our discussion of decision rules proceeds under the
assumption that there is already an appropriate representation of Your be-
liefs and desires. In particular, here we assume that You have imprecise
probabilistic beliefs, i.e. Your belief representor is a set of probability distri-
butions, P, and yet, for simplicity, You have a precise utility function over
basic outcomes.15 The claims of this paper pertain to this assumed set-up –
imprecise probabilities yet precise utility function – but we do not anticipate
any problems in extending the results to the case of both imprecise proba-
bilities and utilities. Before getting to the specifics of the various decision
rules, however, it is important to first specify how, in general, one should
negotiate a sequential-choice problem, since the question of whether or not
to pursue free evidence is a problem of this kind.
3 Sophisticated choice for the imprecise probabilist
Recall that the problem we set up in the previous section involved several
ingredients: first, a particular update rule; second, a particular decision rule;
and third, a particular approach to sequential choice. In the example we
had: generalised conditioning, gamma-maximin, and sophisticated choice.
We take the first and third of these for granted throughout. We will see,
in a moment, an alternative to gamma-maximin that fares better in the
kind of problems we are looking at. But first, we want to spell out a little
more carefully what sophisticated choice amounts to in the current setting.
For precise probabilities, sophisticated choice is the orthodoxy,16 but for
14See [BLINDED]
15One way to conceive of the representation is as follows (cf. Levi (1986); Kaplan (1996)):
You have incomplete preferences which can be identified with a set of complete prefer-
ence orderings that are each possible expected-utility extensions of the incomplete pref-
erences. These extended orderings each correspond to a precise probability and utility
representation. Identifying a partial order with a set of probability–utility pairs is not
straightforward but it can be done: see for example Seidenfeld et al. (1995). Overall,
You are thus represented by the set of these probability-utility pairs. On the basis of
Your probability-utility pairs, the various decision rules specify which acts among those
available are choice-worthy.
16Advocates of the sophisticated approach to sequential choice include Seidenfeld (1988),
Levi (1991) and Maher (1992).
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imprecise probabilities, it has not been fully fleshed out what sophistication
means. We take the following discussion to flesh out the correct version of
sophisticated choice.
3.1 Sophisticated choice, user-friendly version
Recall the sequential-choice reasoning in the previous section. You look at
the terminal nodes and work out which act maximises minimum expectation
with respect to Your representor. This done, You now treat those terminal
nodes as if the choice were fixed. From the earlier node, You treat the
earlier choices as if they were choices that determinately led to the gamma-
maximin-best act. You effectively act as if You know Your future self will
choose that way.
Let’s recast the imprecise decision problem we discussed earlier as a group
decision problem where there is a common utility for the agents in the
group.17 Let’s also state, in accordance with the suggested decision rule,
that the group chooses by evaluating an act by the lowest expected value
assigned to it by some committee member. Recall Figure 2. Each agent
knows that if the group ends up at node 1, the group choice will be to bet
since every member agrees that the expected value of betting at node 1 is
1− δ. Each agent (at node 0) also knows that if the group chooses to learn
and ends up at node 2, the group will choose not to learn, since there is
a committee member who assigns expected value −1 to betting: the agent
who thinks all the black marbles are in urn Y (call this agent Mr. White).
Likewise, at node 3 the group will choose not to bet since there is an agent
who evaluates betting at −1: the agent who thinks all the black marbles
are in urn X (call this agent Mrs. Black). So at node 0, any agent evaluates
choosing to learn as a fifty-fifty gamble between two refusals to bet, result-
ing in expected value of 0. Thus every committee member agrees at node 0
that paying not to learn is better, given what they believe about how the
committee will choose at later nodes. This is the problem of free evidence
for the imprecise probabilist recast as a problem for group belief.
But consider the following alternative reasoning. Note that each committee
member is a precise probabilist, and as such, Good’s theorem applies: each
committee member thinks that learning increases expectation. So each com-
mittee member agrees that choosing to learn is uniquely permissible. Since
any plausible decision rule should respect unanimity of this kind, there is
no problem of free evidence for the imprecise probabilist.
What has gone wrong? We have two ways of reasoning about the decision
17Levi (1986, 1999) has argued that imprecise probabilities are an appropriate model
of group belief, and that individual agents can be conflicted in the same way that groups
can. See also Seidenfeld et al. (1989).
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problem that You or Your credal committee face, and they seem to give
conflicting conclusions. To see what goes wrong with the latter kind of
reasoning, we need to take a detour into backward induction, through Greek
myths, game theory and group decision making.
On his way back from Troy, Odysseus’ ship must sail past the sirens. Circe
has warned Odysseus that the sirens’ song will drive him and his crew mad
and cause them to crash their ship on the treacherous rocks thereabouts.
Wily Odysseus orders his crew to stop their ears with beeswax, Odysseus,
however, is curious to hear what the sirens’ song sounds like. Odysseus has
the option of ordering his crew to tie him to the mast or to be left unhindered.
Possible courses of action once within range of the sirens are for Odysseus to
stay onboard or to dive into the sea and drown. Odysseus would rather not
be tied to the mast, but prefers that to drowning. He knows that the sirens
will cause him to jump overboard if he remains unhindered. So he opts to
have himself tied to the mast, in order to stop him jumping overboard at a
later time.
Let’s be a little clearer about Odysseus’ thinking. There are two relevant
times at which Odysseus must make a choice: he must decide (now) whether
to be tied to the mast, and later whether to jump into the sea and drown.
If he is tied to the mast now, he will not be able to jump overboard. Also, if
he is not tied to the mast, the sirens will drive him mad and make him jump
overboard. In a sense, Odysseus’ most preferred option is to not be tied to
the mast, but then to remain on the boat when in range of the sirens. The
problem is that he knows now that his future self will not stay on board if he
is unhindered. Odysseus is essentially treating his future self as an agent he
does not have full control over, and treating his decision problem as a kind
of game: his current self versus his future self. Given what he knows about
his future self’s preferences (as influenced by the sirens’ song), his choice
(now) should be that which gets him the best outcome on the assumption
that his future self will act in accordance with his future preferences. So he
should tie himself to the mast now so that his future self does not have the
option to jump into the sea. This is an example of backward induction: a
reasoning strategy that is ubiquitous in game theory.
To reiterate: Odysseus’ most preferred option would be to not be tied to the
mast, but then to refrain from jumping overboard.18 He does not, however,
act on this preference, because he is sophisticated enough to take into ac-
count facts about his future choices that are not under his current control.
This makes Odysseus a sophisticated chooser as opposed to a na¨ıve chooser
who would act on his current preference for not being tied up, and ignore the
inevitable future bad consequences of such actions. Sophisticated choice is
18Compare: I prefer that both I and my opponent cooperate to both defecting in a
Prisoners’ Dilemma.
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clearly better than na¨ıve choice: it simply amounts to not ignoring pertinent
facts about Your future choices.
Let’s go back to the second line of reasoning discussed earlier that seemed
to conclude that all the committee members agreed that learning was best.
Consider the two extreme committee members Mrs. Black and Mr. White
who think that all the black (white) marbles are in urn X. Mrs. Black and
Mr. White make up a committee that must collectively make decisions on
whether to learn and how to bet. Mrs. Black thinks that learning increases
expectation because if X is true betting is the right option and if Y is true
not betting is the right option. Mr. White thinks that learning increases
expectation because if X is true not betting is the right option and if Y
is true betting is the right option. Now consider things from Mrs. Black’s
point of view. She is reasoning at node 0 about which option she prefers.
She knows that if the committee arrives at node 1, she and Mr. White will
disagree about what to do, and she is not sure about how such disagreement
will be resolved. So at node 0, Mrs. Black cannot discount the possibility
that at node 1 the committee will choose not to bet (despite that being a
bad option according to Mrs. Black). So what Mrs. Black and Mr. White
agree on is not that the group decision should be to choose to learn, but
merely that if each of them individually were in control of the future choice,
learning would be the right choice. That is, each committee member only
believes learning is the right choice because of what the post-learning choices
would be if that committee member was in charge. Given each committee
member’s uncertainty about how future choices will in fact be resolved, it
is not clear that the committee will make the ‘correct’ choice from that
member’s perspective. And thus, the members do not agree that learning
is necessarily the right choice, given what they know about the committee’s
future choices. And indeed, if the committee members knew that the com-
mittee resolved disagreements by using gamma-maximin, they would agree
that not learning is the better group decision.
3.2 Modelling assumptions
This section serves two purposes: we introduce some formalism that we’ll
need later, and we also make clear some assumptions we make in what
follows.
First, we shall be using the language of choice functions which take as in-
puts the available options and output the set of choice-worthy or admissible
options. For the precise probability case, the standard choice function is
the function that takes a set of options and outputs the set of options that
maximise expected utility.
In accordance with our sophisticated choice approach, Your current options
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C(O1) = Bet; C(O2) = Bet; C(O3) = Don’t Bet
X Y
Don’t Learn 〈3, B;−1,W 〉 〈3, B;−1,W 〉
Learn 〈3, B;−1,W 〉 0
Table 2: Tabular represention of problem in Figure 1
are the acts available to You at the current time, and not paths through the
decision tree or plans of how to act at the current node and all future nodes.
Further, from Your current perspective, You take how You anticipate You
will act at future nodes to be fixed: to be part of the state space of Your
current decision.
Let Oi be the options available at node i. Let’s consider the simple case of
the precise example in Figure 1. So, for i = 1, 2, 3, Oi is the set “Bet, Don’t
Bet”. And O0 – the options at node 0 – is “Learn, Don’t Learn”. The choice
function summarises the options that would be chosen at the node, so for
node 1, C(O1) = Bet. And likewise C(O2) = Bet and C(O3) = Don’t Bet.
These facts about future choices should be encoded in the state space of Your
decision problem at node 0.19 As such, this problem should be summarised
as per Table 2. The events X and Y have probability 0.5 each. Note that
the outcomes in this table are determined by the outcomes that the future
choices will lead to. Some of these outcomes are lotteries. The lottery
〈3, B;−1,W 〉 should be read as follows: ‘Win 3 if B, lose 1 if W ’. By
assumption (recall Figure 1), the lotteries in the X column reduce to a sure
outcome of 3, since Pr(B|X) = 1, and the lottery in the Y column reduces
to a sure outcome of −1, since Pr(B|Y ) = 0.20 Now we again apply the
choice rule to this decision problem, and thus determine C(O0). As noted
earlier, learning has a higher expected utility (EU = 1.5) than not learning
(EU = 1).
Consider a further example. Table 3 represents Your node-0 decision prob-
lem as depicted in Figure 2, with the assumption that the gamma-maximin
decision rule will be applied at any future choice nodes.
Both of the above examples obscure an important fact about the general case
of imprecise sophisticated choice. That is that a choice function may fail
19The implicit assumption here is that You predict Your future self to be rational, i.e. an
expected utility maximiser, and to have beliefs and desires that accord with Your current
self.
20Note in this example Your credences are such that the lottery either has expected
value −1 or 3 depending on whether Urn X or Urn Y is being drawn from, since Your
conditional credences are extreme. But we present the outcome as the lottery to fit with
further examples where You do not have extreme credences.
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C(O1) = Bet; C(O2) = Don’t Bet; C(O3) = Don’t Bet
X Y
Pay not to learn 〈3− δ,B;−1− δ,W 〉 〈3− δ,B;−1− δ,W 〉
Learn 0 0
Table 3: Tabular represention of problem in Figure 2 using gamma-maximin
to determine a unique admissible act. Let’s go through the choice problem
again, but using a different choice rule. Let’s imagine You use the permissive
‘non-dominated-set’ (NDS) decision rule: all Your choice function does is
rule out options that are expectation-dominated. We discuss this rule in
more detail in the next section. You are at node 0 reasoning about how
Your future selves will behave. Your node 1 self is easy: the acts available
– ‘Bet’, ‘Don’t bet’ – each have precise utility 1 − δ and −δ respectively.
So Your node-1 self will choose to bet. Now consider Your node-2 self.
Your beliefs at node 2 have dilated, and with them, Your expectations. The
expectations for ‘Bet’ and ‘Don’t bet’ are [−1, 3] and 0, and neither act
expectation-dominates the other. So from node 0, You do not know how
Your node-2 self will act. The same reasoning goes for node 3. We can thus
represent Your node-0 decision problem as per Table 4. Note that choice
function C can return a set of acts.
C(O1) = Bet; C(O2) = {Bet,Don’t Bet} = C(O3)
X Y
Pay not to Learn 〈3− δ,B;−1− δ,W 〉 〈3− δ,B;−1− δ,W 〉
Learn {0, 〈3, B;−1,W 〉} {0, 〈3, B;−1,W 〉}
Table 4: Tabular represention of problem in Figure 2 for NDS rule
So how should Your node-0 self reason about these unknown future choices?
How should learning be valued at node 0? The choice to learn amounts to a
fifty-fifty chance of one or another future decision problem, neither of which
You know how You will solve. The next section presents our answer to this
question. The presentation may seem complicated, but we maintain that the
complications are a feature of imprecise decision theory when it comes to se-
quential choice. As mentioned, this is one aim of our paper: to make explicit
how imprecise decision rules should be characterised in the sequential-choice
setting. While others (notably Kadane et al. (2008) and Seidenfeld (2004))
have considered how key rules fare in particular sequential-choice problems,
with similar findings to our own, no one has provided a clear account of what
it means to do backwards induction where numerous incommensurable op-
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tions are choice-worthy at future nodes.21
4 The non-dominated-set rule
The latter part of the discussion in the previous section alluded to an impre-
cise decision rule that is less ‘opinionated’ than the gamma-maximin rule.
Roughly, if members of Your credal committee disagree in their preference
between options, then Your overall preference between these options is sim-
ply indeterminate, and there is no saying which will be chosen in a decision
between them. This is effectively the non-dominated-set (NDS) rule, oth-
erwise known as Sen-Walley maximality. We will define it in more precise
terms shortly. The NDS rule is the most permissive decision rule on the
table: it would be a serious flaw of any decision rule that it sanctioned
performing some action when a dominating action was available (i.e. if the
choice rule made permissible something outside of the NDS choice set). This
makes NDS interesting for two reasons. First, it is a very plausible decision
rule, as it does not contrive a preference between incommensurable options
where there is none, so to speak. Second, being the most permissive rule,
NDS is pivotal in our discussion. If even the NDS rule made paying to avoid
free information obligatory, then this would be a killer blow to imprecise
probabilism, since any other less permissive rule would inherit this flaw.
So how the NDS rule fares in ‘free evidence’ situations is more important
that how gamma-maximin fares in those situations. In what follows, we
first give a formal definition of the NDS rule (subsection 4.1) and then we
prove a result for the rule that relates to the third premise of our trilemma
(subsection 4.2). The result is not surprising given the previous work men-
tioned above, but no-one has yet given a treatment as general as ours, nor
as explicit with respect to sequential-choice reasoning.22 We provide such
a general treatment and articulate the correct albeit controversial approach
21In fact, some of Seidenfeld (2004)’s less central remarks are at odds with our account
of sophisticated choice below: his discussion on pp. 85-6 does not respect the fact that
individual ‘committee members’ (cf. Section 3.1) do not have control over the options
that will be chosen at future nodes, that this is rather within the purview of the whole
committee.
22In particular, see Kadane et al. (2008) Sequential Decision Problem 2 for a decision
problem similar to our example in Figure 2. Seidenfeld (2004) gives a general treatment of
the free-evidence problem for both gamma-maximin and Levi’s e-admissibility imprecise
decision rule. The latter rule is very similar to NDS: An option is e-admissible (and
therefore in the choice set, unless a secondary criterion is invoked) just in case it has
maximal expected utility for at least one probability-utility pair in the agent’s belief and
desire representor(s). The set of e-admissible options is always a subset of the NDS choice
set, and in ordinary cases, where sets of probabilities and utilities are closed and convex,
the set of e-admissible options is in fact identical to the NDS choice set; see Schervish et al.
(2003). Our analysis below differs from Seidenfeld’s in that we focus rather on the NDS
rule itself, and we show how this rule needs to be extended to accommodate possibilities
that may arise in the sequential-choice setting.
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to sophisticated choice.
4.1 Formal definition
In formal terms, the NDS rule can be defined in terms of its ‘choice set’
(i.e. the set of admissible options that it returns) as follows:
N(O) = {Aj ∈ O : ∀Ak ∈ O,¬[Aj <EU Ak]}
This needs some unpacking. The meaning of Aj <EU Ak that accords
best with the current literature is as follows: option Aj has lower expected
utility than option Ak according to all probability distributions in Your
representor. In such a case, Aj is strongly dominated by Ak and is thus not
choice-worthy. This definition of <EU will not quite do, however, given the
complications that can arise for the imprecise probabilist making sequential
decisions, that we canvassed at the close of the previous section.
In order to spell out an adequate definition of <EU and thus the NDS rule
for sequential contexts, it helps to return to our example of the imprecise
probabilist facing the decision problem in Figure 2. In accordance with
backwards induction, we determine what will be chosen at the later nodes:
it is clear enough that C(O2) = C(O3) = {Bet, Don’t Bet} by the NDS
rule, since neither betting nor not betting EU -dominates the other.23 In-
deed, thinking in terms of our credal committee: Mrs. Black and Mr. White
disagree on what choices at nodes 2 and 3 maximise expected utility. As
before, C(O1) = Bet, since all committee members agree that this option at
node 1 has higher expected utility. The upshot is that the problem facing the
NDS agent (the credal committee) at the initial node is in fact the problem
represented in Table 4. Everyone in the committee sees, at node 0, that at
nodes 2 and 3 there will be disagreement amongst the committee members,
and either betting or not betting could be chosen at those locations. So the
choice set for node 2 contains both the bet and don’t bet options, likewise
for node 3. Thus, the outcome of opting to learn – which is a mixture of the
outcomes of nodes 2 and 3 – amounts to a mixture of two sets of two future
acts.
So our NDS agent faces the decision problem depicted in Table 4: the com-
plicated case involving outcomes with sets of acts and thus sets of utilities.
For each probability distribution Pri ∈ P (or each committee member i),
the evaluation of an act Aj (here learning) may thus amount to a set of
expected utilities.
23Recall that C(Oi) corresponds to the admissible choices at node i in our example
problem.
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Let us now continue with unpacking the statement Aj <EU Ak:
Aj <EU Ak IF
∀Pri ∈ P [EUi(Aj) <P EUi(Ak)]
EUi(Aj) is the expected utility of act Aj according to probability function
Pri. It can be a set of values if act Aj is not the terminal node of the decision
tree, because of Your uncertainty about Your post-Aj choices. Of course,
the problem now shifts to defining <P . All that has been stipulated about
<P is that, in the case where both EUi(Aj) and EUi(Ak) are singletons,
<P amounts to the simple ‘is less than’ relation for numbers. Thus, when
Aj and Ak lead to outcomes with precise expected utilities for each Pri,
Aj <EU Ak has its standard meaning. Given that the standard NDS rule
appeals to a strictly greater than relation, it makes sense to define <P as
follows:
EUi(Aj) <P EUi(Ak) IF
sup EUi(Aj) < inf EUi(Ak)
The relation <P is sometimes known as the relation of interval dominance.
This makes sense because it holds exactly when one utility interval is entirely
above another. Note that it does behave appropriately in the precise limit.24
We can now finish working through the decision problem in Figure 2 using
our fully-worked-out NDS rule. We have already established, via backwards
induction, that the decision problem at the initial node is given in Table 4.
The question is whether learning EU -dominates not learning, or vice versa.
Consider just one of the extreme probability distributions – that of com-
mittee member Mrs. Black – Pr1, where Pr1(B|X) = 1 and Pr1(B|Y ) = 0.
For this probability distribution alone, the lotteries in Table 4 will thus be
evaluated as per Table 5 below. Note that the lottery outcome in the X
column is evaluated as 3 (or 3 − δ), since Pr1(B|X) = 1. Thus the lottery
outcome in the Y column is evaluated as −1 (or −1− δ).
To work out Mrs. Black’s evaluation of the acts in Table 5 (i.e. learning
versus paying not to learn), we need to generalise the idea of expected value
24cf. Levi’s e-admissibility rule, which we denote L(O). Recall from footnote 22 that
options are in L(O) if and only if the option is maximal for at least one probability distri-
bution in Your representor. To account for the complications that arise in the sequential-
choice setting (outcomes that are sets of possible choices), we could augment Levi’s rule
as follows: for an option to be e-admissible, there must be at least one probability dis-
tribution in Your representor such that no other option interval dominates that option
according to that probability:
L(O) = {Ai ∈ O : ∃Pr ∈ P s.t. ∀Ak ∈ O ¬[EUPr(Ak) ≥P EUPr(Ai)]}
This differs from NDS only in the order of the quantifiers. Clearly e-admissible options
are not EU -dominated; rather L(O) ⊆ N(O).
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C(O1) = Bet; C(O2) = {Bet,Don’t Bet} = C(O3)
X Y
Pay not to Learn 3− δ −1− δ
Learn {0, 3} {0,−1}
Table 5: Tabular represention of problem in Figure 2 for the NDS rule, for
Pr1 (Mrs. Black)
to sets of utilities. An informal characterisation of expected value is ‘the
sum of the probability weighted utilities’. So it’s the probability of the
state times the utility of the act in that state, summed over the states. To
evaluate the act ‘Learn’ in Table 5 above, we need a ‘sum of probability
weighted utility sets’. This means characterising what it means to weight
a set of utilities by a probability, and then what it means to add sets of
probability-weighted utility together. In other words, we need to evaluate:
EU1(Learn) = 0.5× {3, 0}+ 0.5× {−1, 0}
We will need to give an appropriate gloss on what × and + mean in this
context. We suggest that p×A = {pa : a ∈ A}. That is, the multiplication
is done to each element of A. As for A + B, we take this to mean {a + b :
a ∈ A, b ∈ B}. This is the full set of possible sums of elements of A and
B.25 This proposal for how to treat sums and products of sets of values can
be motivated in the same way we motivated the NDS rule: this is the most
permissive plausible proposal for how to deal with arithmetic operations on
sets of values. So this approach is pivotal in the same sense that the NDS
rule is. Returning to the example, this gives:
EU1(Learn) = {−0.5, 0, 1, 1.5}
Paying not to learn has precise utility {1− δ}. Thus it is not the case that
EU1(Learn) <P EU1(Pay not to learn), nor vice versa.
26 Accordingly, just
by looking at Mrs. Black’s evaluation of the options (let alone the evalu-
ations of her fellow committee members) we see that neither learning nor
paying not to learn EU -dominates the other. So at the initial node, both
options are admissible by the NDS rule, i.e. C({Learn,Pay not to learn}) =
{Learn,Pay not to learn}. The NDS rule therefore sanctions paying not to
learn, but in this case, at least, the rule does not require or mandate paying
for ignorance.27 This is an improvement on the gamma-maximin rule.
25If A,B are intervals (i.e. convex), and we interpret p as the degenerate interval [p, p],
then this proposal gives the same result as interval arithmetic (Moore et al., 2009). Since
the >P relation depends only on the biggest and smallest members of A,B, it treats
nonconvex sets in the same way as their smallest convex cover.
26For δ < 1.5.
27Levi’s e-admissibility rule in fact gives the same result here: there is at least one
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4.2 A positive result
While we have seen that paying not to learn may be an admissible option,
according to the NDS rule, there is some good news: for this pivotal im-
precise decision rule, learning free evidence is always itself an admissible
option. That is, it is never the case that not learning or else paying not
to learn is uniquely admissible or obligatory, when learning free evidence is
also an available option.
The structure of the proof follows our working of the decision problem above,
but the idea here is to show that this analysis generalises to all decision
scenarios of the following form: Your beliefs may be imprecise, i.e. Your
belief representor, P, may consist of more than one probability distribution.
(Your utility function over basic outcomes is nonetheless precise.) You face
a decision as to whether to pursue free evidence, sensu Good (1967). As
before, it is a question of whether to make a choice between a set of acts now,
or else make the choice between the same set of acts (with basic outcomes
unchanged) after learning some evidence. We assume, for simplicity, that the
decision to be made now or after learning is not itself a sequential decision
problem. For rhetorical reasons, the option of not learning is adjusted to
include a payment of some small δ. So You can either learn and then make
a decision, or You can pay to not learn and make the decision from a state
of ignorance.
This is the claim to be proven, with reference to the general decision problem
just described:
For the imprecise agent abiding by the NDS rule, learning free
evidence is always an admissible option. That is, not learning or
else paying not to learn free evidence is never uniquely admissi-
ble, when learning is also an available option.
We start by summarising Good’s result. Let’s say we have acts whose out-
comes depend on which of the Hms is true. Call the acts the Ajs. We are
trying to work out whether it pays in expectation to learn which Ek is true.
The Hms partition the state space, as do the Eks. The expectation for not
learning is:
max
j
∑
m
Pr(Hm)U(Aj(Hm))
That is, You know You will pick the act that maximises Your utility after
having chosen not to learn. Using the fact that Pr(Hm) =
∑
k Pr(Ek) Pr(Hm|Ek)
probability function in the representor, the one where Pr(B|X) = 0.5, for which both
learning and not learning have maximal expected utility in the sense stated in footnote 24,
so both options are in the choice set.
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and rearranging the order of summation, we have that this is equal to:
max
j
∑
k
∑
m
Pr(Ek) Pr(Hm|Ek)U(Aj(Hm)) (2)
Now consider learning some Ek. Expectation after learning Ek is:
max
j
∑
m
Pr(Hm|Ek)U(Aj(Hm))
So expectation for learning is the probability weighted sum of these expec-
tations: ∑
k
Pr(Ek) max
j
∑
m
Pr(Hm|Ek)U(Aj(Hm))
We can move the Pr(Ek) inside the summation so this is equal to:∑
k
max
j
∑
m
Pr(Ek) Pr(Hm|Ek)U(Aj(Hm)) (3)
These expressions for learning (3) and not learning (2) differ only in the
order of the summation and maximisation. So all we need to do to prove
the theorem is show that, for any function f(j, k), we have∑
k
max
j
f(j, k) ≥ max
j
∑
k
f(j, k)
Then if we consider f(j, k) =
∑
m Pr(Ek) Pr(Hm|Ek)U(|Aj(Hm)) we have
the result we wanted. So let’s consider the j that maximises
∑
k f(j, k), call
it j0. Clearly maxj f(j, k) ≥ f(j0, k) for any k. Thus∑
k
max
j
f(j, k) ≥
∑
k
f(j0, k) = max
j
∑
k
f(j, k)
That, in brief, is Good’s theorem.28
Returning to our own decision scenario: Let O denote the set of acts at the
initial node: ‘Learn’ and ‘Don’t learn’/‘Pay not to learn’. Let A denote the
set of acts for the decision problem that needs to be solved: ‘Bet’/‘Don’t
bet’ (i.e. the acts that are the rows in Table 1). The possible evidence forms
a partition E: ‘Urn X’ or ‘Urn Y ’.
Now consider the plight of the imprecise agent employing our refined ver-
sion of the NDS rule, as outlined in Section 4.1. Assume Your repre-
sentor, P, consists of probability functions (a. k. a. committee members)
28Good’s result also holds in the infinite case. Our result also seems to go through for
the infinite case, but we hesitate to assert that since we have not yet looked carefully at
whether ‘integrals of sets of values’ are well behaved.
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Pr1,Pr2,Pr3, . . . Take any one of these probability functions Pri. Quite sim-
ply, for this committee member i, we know from Good’s theorem itself that, if
this committee member were a one-person committee, learning is at least as
good as not learning. That is not necessarily the case, given our assumption
of imprecise probabilism – there may be other members in the committee.
Nonetheless, the acts in A that committee member i deems maximal at each
of the respective future choice nodes associated with learning, corresponding
to each Ek that may be learnt, will feature in the choice sets for these nodes
(since, by assumption, the NDS rule is applied at these nodes too.) Thus,
when we evaluate learning versus not learning for any committee member
i, the probability weighted average of utility sets for learning, as discussed
above, will be a set of utilities that includes a utility that is guaranteed, by
Good’s theorem, to be at least as good as the utility of not learning. So for
any committee member i, not learning does not (strictly interval-)dominate
learning. Therefore, not learning (and thus paying not to learn) does not
EU -dominate learning, and so learning is always admissible, for our fully
worked out version of the NDS rule. The basic idea is that if an act is
maximal for some agent, it cannot be dominated.
For clarity, we will restate this proof sketch now more formally. For any
probability function Pri, each possible evidence Ek ∈ E is associated with
an act with maximum precise expected utility amongst the set of available
acts A. Call this act aik. (Assume, with no loss of generality, that there is
a unique such act with maximum precise expected utility for each Pri and
each Ek.)
There is also an act in A that has maximum expected utility, in the uncon-
ditional sense (before learning), according to Pri. Again, assume, with no
loss of generality, that there is a unique such act, which we label Amaxi .
We know, by Good’s theorem, that:∑
k
Pri(Ek)× Ui(aik(Ek)) ≥
∑
k
Pri(Ek)× Ui(Amaxi(Ek))
Here Ui is the utility function that is paired with probability function Pri.
The right-hand term above amounts to the value of not learning for this
probability function Pri in the representor, i.e. EUi(Don’t learn).
The left-most term does not amount to the value of learning with respect to
Pri, however, because we have not taken into account sophisticated choice.
The value of learning for each Pri depends on what would be the sets of
admissible acts if each respective Ek was learnt (the Ck(A)). For each Ek,
these choice sets will at least include the union of all the acts that have max-
imum expected utility, conditional on Ek, for the probability distributions
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Pri in P:
Ck(A) ⊆ a1k ∪ a2k ∪ . . .
⊆
⋃
i
aik
The set of expected utilities that Pri assigns to this choice set under the
assumption that Ek obtains is then
Ui(a1k(Ek)) ∪ Ui(a2k(Ek)) ∪ . . . =
⋃
i
Ui(aik(Ek))
So the value of learning according to the probability function Pri:
EUi(Learn) =
∑
k
Pri(Ek)×
⋃
i
Ui(aik)
As noted in Section 3, we take the above expression to equate to the set of
all combinations of probability weighted sums of utilities, given the utility
sets associated with each Ck(A). Therefore, one of the utility values in the
set EUi(Learn) is
∑
k Pri(Ek)× Ui(aik). That is, the expected utility of
choosing according to the expectations of Pri for each k.
Recall that, by Good’s theorem, this expression is greater than or equal to
the value of not learning, for the probability function in question. Thus,
given our definition of <P , it is NOT the case that
EUi(Learn) <P EUi(Don’t learn)
Therefore, it is not the case that
Learn <EU Don’t learn
That is, learning is always admissible (given a choice of learning and not
learning) by our refined NDS rule.29
4.3 Return to the trilemma
If the only plausible decision rule was the NDS rule, the trilemma stated
in Section 2 would stand. We have seen that this rule sanctions paying to
avoid free evidence, so P3 is true. P1 and P2 are also apparently true, but
the three together yield a contradiction. The positive result proved above,
however, suggests a possible resolution: This is to deny P1 in favour of a
weaker premise, P1′, stating:
29One can also infer from the above that for Levi’s rule, too, learning is always admis-
sible. Indeed, not just for one but for all probability functions Pri, the supremum of the
expected utility values for learning is greater than the expected utility for not learning.
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P1′ Paying to avoid free evidence, or even avoiding free evidence, should
never be uniquely admissible, when pursuing free evidence is also an
available option.
Note that in the precise case, we can satisfy the stronger principle that
learning free evidence before making a decision has to be at least as good
as not learning. This means the precise agent never pays to avoid free
evidence. The above principle amounts to the weaker claim that learning
cannot be worse. Since the precise Bayesian has complete preferences, these
two principles amount to the same thing in the precise case. In the imprecise
case, however, they are importantly different. We have seen that the refined
NDS rule satisfies P1′, but the gamma-maximin rule does not.
5 Broader considerations of dynamic coherence
Could we do better than the NDS rule? Should we be looking for a decision
rule that never even permits paying to avoid free evidence? We think the
answer is no. There’s a sense in which decision rules like NDS30 cannot be
improved on.
If one wants to advocate some form of non-probabilistic epistemology, and
if one wants to link this up with decision theory, then some axiom of the
standard expected utility representation theorems must be denied. The
plausible candidates for denial are the ordering postulate and the indepen-
dence postulate. The NDS rule violates ordering, while the gamma-maximin
rule upholds ordering but violates independence.
Any denial of independence leads to a pragmatic kind of dynamic incoher-
ence: effectively refusing free money. Indeed, the dynamic incoherence can
be seen as a sort of ‘information aversion’ or paying to avoid free evidence
(Seidenfeld, 1988; Wakker, 1988; Al-Najjar and Weinstein, 2009). This is
easily shown via the decision problem in Figure 3. Let A,B,C stand for
lotteries and ApC stand for the mixed lottery ‘A if Z, C otherwise’ where Z
has probability p. Let  be Your strict preference – that is,  is asymmetric
and transitive. Independence is the principle that states that A  B if and
only if ApC  BpC for all C. A violation of independence is thus a set of lot-
teries A,B,C where A  B but it is not the case that ApC  BpC. Assume
a strong violation of independence, i.e. one involving a preference reversal:
BpC  ApC. A sophisticated agent with the above independence-violating
preferences reasons about the decision in Figure 3 as follows (Seidenfeld,
1988; Steele, 2010): You start by looking at the ‘terminal’ decisions: those
decisions with no further choices following them. In this case, those are the
choices at nodes 1 and 2. In each case, the arrow to the right highlights
30We noted in the previous section that our results concerning the NDS rule also apply
to Levi’s e-admissibility rule (cf. Seidenfeld (2004).)
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−δ
Figure 3: A decision tree that yields information aversion (after Seidenfeld
(1988))
the hypothetically chosen option. Both these choices can be read off the
preferences: A  B, so A is chosen at node 1, but BpC  ApC, so BpC is
chosen at node 2. Now consider the choice from node zero. Since You know
that your node 1 choice will be to choose A, the ‘up’ option of node 0 is
effectively the gamble ApC. The ‘down’ option of node 0 is a choice between
the two gambles ApC and BpC. Since You prefer BpC to ApC, you prefer
to go down at node 0. Since the preference is strict, there is some small
amount of money, δ, that You would pay to go down if offered this decision
problem. Recall that p is the probability of event Z. Note that choosing up
is effectively choosing to learn whether Z is true before making Your choice.
Since You prefer down to up, You would pay to avoid learning whether X
has occurred. The only thing needed to get this example going was a strong
violation of independence.31
We advocate, instead, dropping the ordering postulate: the induced prefer-
ence can be incomplete. As we have seen, such decision rules also sometimes
suffer from issues with information aversion. However, they merely permit
– never mandate – paying to avoid free evidence. This is an advantage
over independence-violating decision rules. See also [BLINDED] for further
discussion of permissision and obligation in the context of sure loss and
sequential choice.
6 Concluding Remarks
Let us return to the trilemma that we began with:
P1 Paying to avoid free evidence is irrational.
P2 Incomplete preferences are not irrational, and can be represented by
31Epstein and Le Breton (1993)’s theorem also dashes hopes for theories that violate
Independence but retain Ordering. The theorem effectively shows that the imprecise
probabilist cannot keep Ordering and also avoid information aversion.
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sets of probabilities and utilities. In other words, imprecise probabilism
is permissible.
P3 All plausible decision theories for handling imprecision sanction paying
to avoid free evidence.
Of course, one could always deny P2, and claim that imprecise probabilism
is evidently irrational. But we think there are compelling reasons for beliefs
being imprecise, and so we consider this ‘way out’ to be a last resort (but
see Al-Najjar and Weinstein (2009) for a different opinion).
Alternatively, one could deny that ‘free evidence’ has any natural meaning.
This could be reasonable: ‘free’ only makes sense with respect to some notion
of value, and notions of value seem intimately tied to theories of decision.
One might say that evidence is free by the lights of some decision theory
just in case You would not pay to avoid this evidence if You were abiding by
the theory. In terms of our trilemma, this move denies P3—that decision
theories for handling imprecision allow paying to avoid free evidence—by
claiming that the evidence is not free, by definition. Of course, the spin-off
of this move is that P1 is rendered vacuous. A resolution of this sort might
be appealing to those who already regard free evidence a merely technical
term in the precise context.
We do not consider this a reasonable response, since Good’s definition of free
evidence seems intuitive, and applicable to a wide class of decision theories.
Recall that evidence is free by the standards of Good’s proof if learning
this evidence does not otherwise change Your decision problem. That is,
You update Your beliefs according to conditionalisation, but the available
options A1, . . . , As, and the utilities of the outcomes associated with these
options remain the same, whatever evidence is learnt.32
One might object to P1 on the grounds that there are cases of intuitively free
evidence that You might reasonably want to avoid. For instance, imagine
You are trying to decide between reading Murder on the Orient Express and
going for walk, and then someone offers to tell You who killed Mr. Ratchett
before You make the decision. Common sense tells us that it may be disad-
vantageous for You to accept this evidence, even if it comes with no explicit
charge, which seems strangely at odds with Good’s theorem.
Closer inspection of the above case reveals that the evidence, while not
incurring a monetary or other material cost, is not free in the Good sense
because it may change the outcomes of the reading option: reading the
novel when You know who did it is not the same act as reading the novel
32Of course, in many cases it is beneficial for the precise probabilist to pursue costly
evidence; it depends on the details of the case at hand. Good’s proof is interesting,
however, because it establishes the general claim: that it is never a bad thing to pursue
free evidence.
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when You are one step behind Poirot and his little grey cells. That is to
say that there is intrinsic value to Your current state of ignorance with
respect to the identity of the murderer: you enjoy your reading of the novel
more while not knowing who did it. Kadane et al. (2008) discuss a similar
case (Example 12). States of belief having intrinsic value offer well-known
exceptions to various Bayesian theorems, for example Dutch book arguments
for additivity or conditionalisation.
What we have done in this paper is examine premises P1 and P3, with
their meanings taken at face value. We have shown that something stronger
than P3 in fact holds – it is not just the ‘extant’ decision theories that
permit paying to avoid evidence, but in fact any plausible decision theory
for handling imprecision permits paying to avoid free evidence in some cases.
On the positive side, however, we have refined the consequence of ‘paying
to avoid evidence’. Certain decision theories – those akin to the NDS rule33
– do indeed permit paying to avoid free evidence in ‘problem cases’ that
apparently all involve dilation, but these theories never have avoiding free
evidence as the uniquely admissible option when learning is available.
So, if we are willing to revise premise P1 in favour of P1′, then there is no
longer a contradiction. Note that P3 can also be revised to P3′ so that it is
more informative:
P1′ Paying to avoid free evidence, or even avoiding free evidence, should
never be uniquely admissible, when pursuing free evidence is also an
available option.
P2 Incomplete preferences are not irrational, and can be represented by
sets of probabilities and utilities. In other words, imprecise probabilism
is permissible.
P3′ For a certain class of decision rules akin to the Sen-Walley Maximality
rule, learning free evidence is always admissible, but paying to avoid
free evidence may sometimes be admissible too. There are no plausible
decision rules that fare better than this, in the sense of never permitting
paying to avoid free evidence.
This is, in our opinion, the best weakening or ‘way out’ of the original
trilemma. It gives us the conclusion that the NDS rule is as good as it gets
for the imprecise probabilist when it comes to negotiating free evidence.
33The NDS rule is the most ‘permissive’ decision rule, but we have noted that rules at
least as permissive as Levi’s e-admissibility rule behave similarly to NDS with respect to
free evidence.
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